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CASE
"It is difficult to discover any cogent defensive arguments
against placing all probate jurisdiction, including determination
of the homestead character of both realty and personalty, in the
county judge's court ....
[because] ... Obviously the probate
court is the tribunal best suited to perform this function in the
first instance."
This article points out the rights of appeal to the circuit court and
to the Florida Supreme Court and argues that, if hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property can be entrusted to a county judge,
surely the first thousand in personalty and the homestead status of
2
realty can likewise be entrusted to him.1
In the future the Florida Supreme Court undoubtedly will favor
determination by a county judge of realty's homestead status, at least
regarding inclusion in, or exclusion from, an estate in the process of
administration. A decision otherwise will, as in previous cases, result in suspension of probate proceedings in the county judge's court
while judge and administrator await the decision of the circuit court
on the status question. The rule announced in the instant case benefits both the litigants and the courts in eliminating transfer of the
status question to the circuit courts, in reducing court costs to litigants,
and in expediting probate proceedings. A litigant's right of appeal
to the circuit court, moreover, remains unimpaired.
M. R. ADKINS

LABOR LAW: REPRESENTATION PETITION BARRED ONLY
UNTIL EXPIRATION OF BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Ludlow Typograph Company, 108 N.L.R.B. No. 209 (June 25, 1954)
In October 1952, following a representation election by company
employees, the National Labor Relations Board certified the International Association of Machinists as a bargaining representative. In
December 1952 the employer and the IAM entered into a collective
bargaining agreement effective from November 1, 1952, to November
1, 1953. A rival union, the International Union of Engravers, informed
12Ibid.
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the employer on August 10, 1953, that it represented the employees and
on August 11 filed a representation petition. On August 26 a third
union requested representation and filed a petition on August 27.
On September 16, 1953, the employer and the incumbent IAM terminated their prior contract by signing a new bargaining contract effective retroactively from August 17, 1953, to August 17, 1955. The IUE
and the third union's requests for recognition and bargaining were
made, and their petitions filed, before the IAM and the employer
signed the new contract. HELD, the September 1953 collective bargaining agreement between certified union and employer did not bar the
earlier petitions of other unions for representation.
The NLRB has held that certification barred consideration of rival
representation petitions for one year from the date of certification and
created a duty in the employer to bargain in good faith with the
certified union exclusively during the one-year period., Prior to the
instant case, the Board followed the holding of The Quaker Maid Co.2
that the signing of a renewal contract between the incumbent union
and the employer within one year after certification barred a rival
union's petition for the period of the contract. This was true even
if it was executed with notice of a timely representation claim by
a rival union. 3 An agreement for the extension of an expiring contract until a new contract was consummated, however, did not bar
a representation petition; such an agreement was regarded as an extension for an indefinite period.4 Had the NLRB applied the Quaker
Maid rule in the instant case, the September 1953 contract between the
IAM and the employer, which was signed within the certification year,
would have barred consideration of the petitions of the IUE and
the third union. The Board, however, expressly refused to apply the
rule.
The majority opinion, overruling the Quaker Maid rationale, emphasizes the employees' right of freedom of choice in selecting a
representative. The instant case holds that when an employer and a
certified union enter into a collective bargaining agreement the time
period of that contract, rather than the one-year period from the date
'Centr-O-Cast & Engineering Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1952); De Vry Corp., 73
N.L.R.B. 1145 (1947).
271 N.L.R.B. 915 (1946).
3
Texas Paper Box Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 799 (1948); De Vry Corp., 73 N.L.R.B.
1145 (1947).
4Hytron Radio & Electronics Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 267 (1946); Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 750 (1945).
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of certification, determines whether a rival union's petition filed within one year of the date of certification is barred. Clearly, the contract period may either lessen or extend the prior one-year period. The
majority position is that the Quaker Maid rule unduly prolongs the
protection afforded an employer and the incumbent union. This view
necessarily modifies the rule dismissing representation petitions filed
during the certification year that was applied by the NLRB prior to
this case.5 Two subsequent Board decisions6 follow this majority
doctrine. In one, the Ludlow policy operated retroactively to reinstate
a petition that had been voluntarily withdrawn by the union.7
The minority opinion attacks the allowance of a challenge of a
certified union's majority status upon expiration of the term of its
initial contract. The dissenters point to Centr-O-Cast & Engineering
Co.,8 in which the Board stated that the Quaker Maid rule accomplished the dual purpose of encouraging the execution of a collective
bargaining contract and enhancing the stability of union relations.
They further contend that a newly certified union will hesitate to
agree to a short term contract, since it might thus lose its right of
representation within the year following certification. By the same
token, an employer might strive for a short term contract in order to
expeditiously eliminate his absolute duty to bargain with the newly
certified union. The dissenting opinion indicates that these conflicting
aims might promote industrial strife.
The avowed policy of the Taft-Hartley Act 9 is to promote stability
in employer-employee relationships. The instant case fails to promote
the policy that a bargaining relationship once rightfully established
must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period to
insure a fair chance of success. 10
GEORGE VEGA, JR.

sSee Centr-O-Cast 8 Engineering Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1952).
6Flintkote Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (Sept. 10, 1954); Natvar Corp., 109 N.L.R.B.
No. 186 (Sept. 10, 1954).
7Natvar Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Sept. 10, 1954).
8100 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1508 (1952) (dictum).
961 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §141 (1952).
IoSee Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); Centr-O-Cast &
Engineering Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1952).
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